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1. Introduction
Having observed the decrease in ¯sh resource stocks worldwide, it is im-
portant to ¯nd out the solution for sustainable use of those resources.1)
Governments have often enforced top-down types of catch-restrictive mea-
sures, such as quotas and closed season, which may work well for this
purpose. However, these types of measures can give ¯shers the wrong in-
centives if they are not conscious of the importance of sustainability. For
example, restrictions on vessel scale lead to vessels with higher horsepower
that allow ¯shers to go ¯shing more times than they can do with lower-
horsepower vessels. Quotas may lead to the disposal of low-value species
because ¯shers are usually not able to select species before they haul up
their nets. Moreover, marine environmental situations are di®erent across
areas. The characteristics of ¯shers and customs are also di®erent among
communities. Thus, it is becoming more important for local and central
authorities to elaborate a package of measures for each area/community to
avoid over¯shing.
Territorial used rights ¯sheries (TURF) management is one possibly ef-
fective measure. The purpose of TURF is to allocate rights to use ¯sh
resources in speci¯c geographic areas to speci¯c ¯shers or groups of ¯shers,
and make those ¯shers create their own resource management schemes.2)
Fishers are familiar with the situation of ¯shing grounds they use and they
usually have lived in the community for a long time even across the gen-
erations. Thus, if they are able to devise a scheme to use their resources
sustainably by themselves, this type of management is desirable. In other
words, whether TURF schemes work e®ectively depends on cooperative
1) According to the FAO?2012?, 30% of ¯sh species around the world were overex-
ploited as of 2009, and this ratio has increased continuously.
2) This type of management system was formally de¯ned by Christy (1983). For the
Japanese TURF scheme, see Cancino et al. (2007), Makino and Matsuda (2005),
and Yamamoto (1995).
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behavior of ¯shers within a community.
The purposes of this paper are (i) to examine the relationship between
personal attributes and the preference for cooperation (social preference),
and (ii) to examine the relationship between personal attributes and co-
operative behavior. This analysis is the ¯rst step towards clarifying what
types of ¯shers are able to behave cooperatively and, accordingly which
communities ¯t with the aim of TURF management schemes.
To this end, we use the method of ¯eld experiments that can clarify
behavior and preferences of subjects. In environmental and resource eco-
nomics, the method has often been used because behavior of local people
is critical for the protection of the local environment.3) In particular, we
use the results of experiments carried out in the ¯shing villages of Puerto
Princesa, the Philippines, in May 2014. We conducted a game to extract
social (cooperative) preference and the public-goods game (PGG) with
other 4 types of games. Subjects of the experimental survey are ¯shers.
We also carried out a questionnaire survey to obtain data on personal and
community attributes of those subjects.
The main results are as follows. We ¯nd that the more education a ¯sher
received, and/or the higher is his income, the more likely it is that he would
be cooperative/altruistic rather than aggressive. It is also veri¯ed that
¯shing experience has a signi¯cantly negative e®ect on social preference.
The results about cooperative behavior are also interesting. The behavior
of altruistic/cooperative ¯shers is rational while that of other types of
¯shers is not rational. It is also veri¯ed that the more experience a ¯sher
has, and/or the less migratory people of his community are, the more likely
it is that he will behave cooperatively.
3) For the articles using ¯eld experimental methods, for example, see Castillo et al.
(2011), Glecich et al. (2007), Kanchanaroek et al. (2013), Nguyen and Leung
(2009), and Velez et al. (2010).
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Section 2 describes the design of experimental and questionnaire sur-
veys. Section 3 investigates the relationship among personal attributes,
social preferences, and cooperative behavior. Section 4 provides conclud-
ing remarks.
2. Design of Experimental and Questionnaire Surveys
We conducted a series of surveys in May 2014 in the suburban area of
Puerto Princesa City. We conducted 2 sessions on 13th and 1 session on
14th and 15th. Puerto Princesa is located in the middle of Palawan Island,
which faces the South China (West Philippine) Sea. The ¯shing industry,
in particular coastal ¯shing is one of the important industries for local
people in the island. 14 subjects participated in the ¯rst session and 16
subjects participated in each of the other sessions, giving us 62 samples for
the following analysis. All of them were male ¯shers. Experimental games
were conducted by Arvin Vista, one of the authors, and Elmer Sunaz, an
assistant.4)
Although we conducted six types of games, we explain two of them in
detail, and we focus on those two in this paper.5) The ¯rst one is a game to
extract social (cooperative) preferences of subjects. In this game, 8 pairs
were made randomly. Each subject did not know who exactly their partner
was. Following O®erman (1996) and Park (2000), we use the method of
value orientation, which has been used not only in economics but also in
other ¯elds such as social psychology. This game consisted of 24 questions
(See Figure 1). In each question, subjects chose between two alternatives:
Choice A and Choice B. Each option speci¯es an amount of points to the
4) He is an graduate student of Department of Agricultural Economics, College of
Economics and Management, University of Philippines Los Banos.
5) The other games were the game to extract risk preference, the game to extract
time preference, the dictator game, and the ultimatum game.
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Figure 1. Questions in Game 3
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Figure 1. Questions in Game 3 (Cont'd.)
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subject (x) and an amount to the partner (y). Following Park (2000), we
set up the pairs of amounts of points so that x2 + y2 = 152. Each subject
was told that his total points would be the sum of the amount he kept for
himself and the amount his partner gave to him. For example, in the case
of Question 1, i) if a subject chooses Choice A and his partner chooses
Choice A, both he and his partner receive 15 points, ii) if a subject chooses
Choice A and his partner chooses Choice B, he receives 14.5 points and
his partner receives 18.9 points, iii) if he chooses Choice B and his partner
chooses Choice A, he receives 18.9 points and his partner receives 14.5
points, and iv) if he chooses Choice B and his partner chooses Choice B,
both he and his partner receive 18.4 points.
We use each subject's allocation of points, calculate the tangent/vector,
and classify him into one of 5 groups. In general, subjects with observed
vectors lying between degrees ¡112.5 and ¡67.5 are classi¯ed as aggressive
(or Type 5 ), subjects with vectors between ¡67.5 and ¡22.5 are classi¯ed
as competitive (or Type 4 ), subjects with vectors between ¡22.5 and 22.5
are classi¯ed as individualistic (or Type 3 ), subjects with vectors between
22.5 and 67.5 are classi¯ed as cooperative (or Type 2 ), and subjects with
vectors between 67.5 and 112.5 are classi¯ed as altruistic (or Type 1 ). See
Figure 2 for these classi¯cations.
The second game is a PGG. It is important to investigate the relationship
between preferences and behavior. In this game, each subject became a
member of a group that consisted of 4 subjects. Each member decided
how much he would contribute for a public/group project and how much
he would use for herself/himself. In other words, in this game, he divided
his money for two di®erent purposes. This time, the amount of money was
PHP 300: PHP 1 was approximately equal to JPY 2.5.6) The members
6) PHP denotes the currency unit of the Philippines: the Philippine peso.
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were chosen randomly. In addition, each member did not exactly know the
other members of the group. The contribution became twice as much as the
sum of the contribution by 4 members. Then, the doubled contribution was
divided equally for each member of the group. This game was repeated 5
times/rounds in total in each session. They could not carry over the payo®
to the next round.7)
After the experimental games were ¯nished, we gave a questionnaire
survey. We investigated (i) personal attributes, such as age, occupation,
and income, (ii) community attributes, such as customs and biodiversity,
and (iii) ¯shing activities, such as species, gears, and the experience of
depletion of ¯sh stocks. See Table 1 for the summary statistics of some of
those personal and community attributes.
Figure 2. Type Classi¯cation
Altruistic 
Other (?) 
Self (?) Self (?) 
Other (-) 
Cooperative 
Individualistic 
Competitive 
Aggressive 
(Park, 2000, Figure 1, pp.409, and O®erman, 1996, Figure 1, pp.823)
7) After all of the survey were ¯nished, we paid the reward to each subject: the
amount was di®erent among subjects depending on the records of the experimental
games.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Questionnaire Survey
???? ?? ???? ?? ??????? ?????? ?????
??? ?? ?? ?????? ?? ??????
???????????????????? ????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????
????????????????? ?? ? ????? ? ?????
??????????????????????????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ???????
?????????????????????????? ?? ? ?????? ?? ??????
???????? ? ? ?????
????????? ? ? ?????
- Customs and Migratory are community attributes. The variable of customs is equal
to 1 (0) when a subject answers that the community he belongs keeps (does not keep)
traditional customs. The variable of migratory is equal to 3 (2) when a subject answers
that many (some) people in his community historically migrated from the other areas,
and equal to 1 when a subject answers that local people are basically indigenous.
- Basically, the sample number is 62. However, we observed some NAs. Thus, the
sample number for Fishing Area is 57, and that for Migratory is 61.
3. Results
3.1 Personal Attributes and Social Preference
We ¯rst examine the relationship between personal attributes and social
preference. In particular, we focus here on education, ¯shing experience,
and income. As the variable that represents the education level, we adopt
the number of years that each subject received education. The minimum
is 1, which implies that the ¯sher dropped out after he ¯nished a ¯rst-year
education at an elementary school. The maximum is 14, which implies
that the ¯sher graduated from a two-year college. Fishing experience is
the number of years that each ¯sher has been engaging in ¯shing activities.
Moreover, we use monthly household income.
First, let us focus on the types of subjects. We classify the types of
subjects according to the criteria noted in the previous section. We have 7
altruistic, 12 cooperative, 13 individualistic, 4 competitive, and 2 aggressive
samples. This time, we have 24 samples that cannot be classi¯ed into any
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of these 5 types. The vectors of 17 subjects are between 112.5 and 180, and
those of 7 subjects are between ¡180 and ¡112.5. We de¯ne the former
subjects as Type 0 and the latter subjects as Type 6.
We conducted a multinomial logit analysis for estimating the relationship
between personal attributes and types. The result is shown in Table 2(a).
In this estimation, Types 0 and 6 are excluded. It is veri¯ed that education
in°uences the social preference of ¯shers. The more education a ¯sher
received, the more likely it is that he is cooperative/altruistic rather than
aggressive. On the other hand, there is no clear relationship between ¯shing
experience and types.
We also conducted statistical tests to check the di®erences between
types. To this end, we divided subjects of Types 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 into
two groups. The ¯rst group consists of altruistic and cooperative sub-
jects and the second group consists of individualistic, competitive, and
aggressive subjects. Table 2 (b) shows the results of both Mann-Whitney
test and t-test. Both tests reveal that there is a signi¯cant di®erence in
education between the two groups. Additionally, the t-test reveals that
there is a signi¯cant di®erence in income between the two groups. The
results imply that the income and education of the ¯rst group (altruistic
and cooperative) are higher than those of the second group (individualistic,
competitive, and aggressive).
Moreover, we examined the characteristics of Type 0 and 6. Although we
do not show the statistical results, there is no signi¯cant di®erence between
Type 0 and 1 when focusing on education level and income. On the other
hand, there is a signi¯cant di®erence in income between Types 5 and 6
according to t-test: the average income of Type 6 subjects is higher than
that of Type 5. There is also a signi¯cant di®erence in education between
Type 0 and 6 according to the t-test: the education level of Type 6 is lower
than Type 0. These results for Types 0 and 6 are interesting. A ¯sher
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Table 2(a). Estmation Results for Types (Multinomial Logit)
???? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
????????? ????? ????? ????? ?????
??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
????????????????????? ????? ????? ????? ?????
??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
???????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
- Log-likelihood is -50.887
- The values in the parentheses are z-values.
- The reference category is Type 5.
Table 2(b). Di®erence between Altruistic/Cooperative and
Individualistic/Competitive/Aggressive
????? ?????? ??????
?????? ????? ?????
????????? ????? ?????
- The values are p-values.
Table 2(c). Estmation Results for Cooperative/Altruistic
?????????????????? ?????
????????? ?????
???????
????????????????????? ???????
????????
???????? ?????????
???????
?????????????????? ?????
??????????? ?????
- NQSUM: The number of questions in which a Choice that maximizes the sum of the
points is chosen.
- The values in the parentheses are t-values.
- The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1 percent, 5
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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whose income is high but whose education level is low is likely to be Type
6. On the other hand, in answering the questions of the social preference
game, Type 0 behaved as Type 1 did. Moreover, compared with Type 1,
Type 0 subjects possibly sacri¯ced themselves to a greater degree.
Second, using all of the samples, including Types 0 and 6, we examine
the relationship between personal attributes and the number of questions
that each subject chose so that the total points were maximized. The result
is shown in Table 2(c). In this case, ¯shing experience has a signi¯cantly
negative e®ect on the social preference: the more experience a ¯sher has,
the more likely it is that he has less preference for cooperation. Although
we also examined the number of questions that each subject chose so that
the partner's points were maximized, we did not obtain any signi¯cant
results.
3.2 Social Preference and Cooperative Behavior
Now let us consider the relationship between social preference and co-
operative behavior. In this paper, we use the contributions in the PGG
to extract the behavior of subjects in a situation in which non-cooperative
behavior is rational. Having observed the results of the PGG, we ¯nd an
interesting trend with regard to the contributions of subjects. As we did
in the previous section, we divided all subjects into two groups: the group
of altruistic and cooperative, and the group of individualistic, competitive,
and aggressive. The average contribution of subjects of each group is shown
in Table 3(a). Except for the second round, the average contribution of the
latter group was larger than that of the former group. Moreover, the aver-
age contribution of the latter group increased as time passed. On the other
hand, the average contributions of the former group in the last two rounds
were greater than those of the second and third rounds. The trend of the al-
truistic/cooperative group is a relatively normal one in terms of rationality.
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On the other hand, the behavior of individualistic/competitive/aggressive
subjects does not seem to be rational.
We also conducted an estimation by the ordinary least-squares method.
The dependent variable is the contribution for the group project. In ad-
dition to personal attributes used in the previous section, we add one
community-attribute variable: migratory. This variable is equal to 3 (2)
when a subject answers that many (some) people in his community histori-
cally migrated from the other areas, and equal to 1 when a subject answers
that local people are basically indigenous. We also add a type dummy that
is equal to 1 when a subject is classi¯ed into altruistic or cooperative. The
results are shown in Table 3(b).
When we focus on the ¯rst round, it is veri¯ed that ¯shing experience and
migration have signi¯cant e®ects on the contribution for the group project.
The more experience a ¯sher has, the greater is his contribution. This result
is interesting when compared with the result of the social preference. In
the previous section, we obtain a negative e®ect of ¯shing experience on the
preference for cooperation. However, when directly observing the behavior,
¯shing experience positively a®ects cooperative behavior. One possible
story is as follows. The more experience a ¯sher has, the more likely it is
that he considers his own bene¯t. In other words, he became a true ¯sher
because ¯shers originally think about their own hauls. However, they have
also learned that cooperation among ¯shers often bene¯ts themselves in the
future because cooperation avoids the depletion of resource stocks. Thus,
they are able to behave cooperatively.
The migratory level has a negative e®ect on the contribution: the more
migratory people of the community are, the less a ¯sher who belongs to the
community contributes for the group project. This result is intuitive and
reveals that the ties among local people through long-time relationships
among neighbors are important for occurrence of cooperative behavior.
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Type dummy also has a negative e®ect on the contribution. The possible
reason is that education and income in°uence the contributions through
social preference.
Although we cannot ¯nd any signi¯cant relationships between depen-
dent and independent variables in the other rounds, the results of both
Tables 3(a) and 3(b) reveal that a high preference for cooperation does
not necessarily lead to highly cooperative behavior. For example, a higher
Table 3(a). Avereage Contribution for Group Projects
????????? ???????????
??????? ??????? ???????
??????? ??? ???????
??????? ??????? ???????
??????? ??????? ???????
??????? ??????? ???????
Table Table 3(b). Estmation Results for Cooperative Behavior
?????????????????? ?????? ??????
????????? ?????? ??????
? ???????? ????????
?????????????????? ?????? ?????
? ??????? ???????
?????????????? ????? ??????
? ??????? ????????
????????? ???????? ??????
? ???????? ????????
?????????????? ???????? ???????
? ???????? ????????
???????? ?????????? ??????????
? ??????? ???????
?????????????????? ????? ?????
??????????? ????? ?????
- The values in the parentheses are t-values.
- The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1 percent, 5
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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education level is able to give rise to a higher preference for cooperation.
However, at the same time, people with a higher education level behave
more rationally than people with a lower education level do. Thus, it is
possible that there is no clear di®erence in observed cooperative behavior
between people with high and low education levels.
4. Concluding Remarks
Using the data from the ¯eld experiments carried out in the ¯shing
villages of Palawan Island in the Philippines, we extracted the social pref-
erence and cooperative behavior ¯shers. We also used data from a ques-
tionnaire survey that extracted the personal and community attributes of
¯shers/subjects.
First, we found interesting results about the relationship between per-
sonal attributes and social preference. It is veri¯ed that the more edu-
cation a ¯sher received, the more likely it is that he would be cooper-
ative/altruistic rather than aggressive. Mann-Whitney ant t- tests also
reveal that education and income in°uence the social preferences of ¯sh-
ers. It is also veri¯ed that ¯shing experience has a signi¯cantly negative
e®ect on social preference: the more experience a ¯sher has, the more likely
it is that he has less preference for cooperation.
Second, the results about cooperative behavior are also interesting. The
behavior of altruistic/cooperative ¯shers is rational while that of other
types of ¯shers is not rational. It is veri¯ed that the more experience a
¯sher has, the more likely it is that he will behave cooperatively. The
migratory level has a negative e®ect on the contribution: the more mi-
gratory people of the community are, the less a ¯sher who belongs to the
community contributes to the group project.
The sample size we used in this paper is relatively small. Therefore, this
analysis can be considered as the ¯rst step for achieving our goal. In fact,
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we have already conducted similar experimental and questionnaire surveys
in Mindanao (the Philippines) and three areas in Indonesia. Combining all
of these experimental data, we believe that we will obtain robust results.
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